Human rights with a vengeance: one hundred years of retributive humanitarianism by Simpson, Gerry
1 
 
Kirby Lecture, 2015, ANU. 
Human Rights with a Vengeance: One Hundred Years of 
Retributive Humanitarianism 
 
2015: Julie Bishop in Manhattan. Human Rights with a Vengeance   
1915: Edith Cavell at tir nationale ; Billy Hughes in Whitehall. 
“Treason against Mankind”. 
1937:  Nikolai Bukharin in Moscow; Rudolf Slansky in Prague; 
Winston Smith at Victory Mansions. Mistakes, Crimes, Spectacle 
1945: Francoise de Menthon at the Peace Palace; Primo Levi at 
Auschwitz. Humanity’s Crimes  
1961: “Lolita” in Jerusalem: A Digression 
1987-1997: Klaus Barbie in Lyon; Dusko Tadic in The Hague; 
Martin Bormann in Frankfurt. Nazis and others 
1915-2015: David Lloyd-George at Versailles; Rebecca West in 
Nuremberg; Leonard Woolf at 46 Gordon Square, Bloomsbury, 
WC1;  Malika Husseinova in Karabulak: Four Gardens  
 
 
 
 
2 
 
I would like to thank CIPL, the ANU College of Law and the ANU 
itself for hosting this lecture. Special thanks go to my friend, Kim 
Rubenstein, for organising the lecture, inviting me to present this 
evening and for her lovely introduction . Thanks also to Nicole Harman 
for facilitating this event.  
It’s a pleasure to be back at the ANU where I spent several happy years 
and, in Canberra, where one of my daughters, Rosa Cass-Simpson (who 
I promised not to mention by name tonight), was born at the Calvary 
Hospital in 1998.  
I would like to thank Justice Kirby for giving his name to this lecture 
and for being present this evening. I came to a Kirby Lecture once 
where Michael Kirby appeared on an enormous screen behind the 
podium introducing, but at the same time dwarfing, the lecturer. I am 
referring briefly to Orwell this evening and there was something vaguely, 
though benignly, big brotherish about Justice Kirby’s appearance that 
night.  
Finally, though, I want to mention the three deans I have worked with at 
the ANU Law School: Stephen Bottomley for his good-humoured 
support during my various visits to ANU Law School in recent years; 
Tom Campbell for hiring me as a lecturer and for intellectual guidance 
and friendship. And to Michael Coper whose stylish, witty deaning 
would always light up evenings like this.   
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2015: Julie Bishop in Manhattan: Human Rights with a Vengeance 
 
 “Despite an impassioned speech by its Foreign Minister, there was 
a failure [Iran failed] to win Security Council support today for a 
resolution condemning [the United States for] the downing of the 
[Iranian] airliner. Diplomats said they [Teheran] would have to settle 
for a less harshly worded statement.”  
 
This passage is taken from the front page of the New York Times, July 
14th 1988.1  
The destruction of the airliner was described by the sponsoring state as a 
“pure act of terrorism, a ruthless crime”. But the state allegedly 
responsible for the act called it “a tragic but understandable mistake”. 
The incident was complicated by the fact that it had taken place in the 
midst of a war with its own very profound geopolitical consequences. 
 
In early July 1988, an Iranian Airbus, Flight 655, carrying 290 passengers 
was shot out of the sky by two missiles fired from a U.S. warship. The 
captain was eventually commended for his action with a Legion of 
Merit. Soon-to-be President George Bush Snr, said on the election trail:  
“I will never apologize for the United States — I don't care what the 
facts are... I'm not an apologize-for-America kind of guy”.  
 
The International Civil Aviation Council, meanwhile, at its meeting in 
Montreal in March 1989: “deeply deplored the tragic incident which 
                                                          
1 http://www.nytimes.com/1988/07/15/world/iran-falls-short-in-drive-at-un-to-condemn-us-in-airbus-case.html 
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occurred as a consequence of events and errors…which resulted in the 
accidental destruction of an Iran Air Airliner”.2   
 
Of course, this all sounds very like the recent events surrounding the 
shooting down of MH17. 
 
One very important distinction between this incident and last month’s 
Security Council meeting -  a distinction that lies at the heart of my talk 
tonight - is that the Iranians wanted a Security Council resolution 
condemning the U.S. action. The Australian Government certainly 
wanted that this year but it wanted something else as well. It asked the 
Council to establish a war crimes tribunal to try those responsible for the 
deaths of the passengers.  The Security Council Draft Resolution was 
very circumspect in its language, though, with the Council “convinced 
that in the particular circumstances of this incident, the establishment of an 
international criminal tribunal” is warranted and deciding to establish an 
international tribunal “for the sole purpose” of prosecuting those 
responsible.  
I hope to show tonight that this particularism is a standard feature of 
war crimes law and that it rubs awkwardly up against the apparent 
universalism of international criminal justice and the requirements of 
generality associated with the rule of law itself.   
 
 
                                                          
2 ICAO News Release PIO/4/89. 
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In less circumspect language, the Foreign Minister, Julie Bishop, said 
that the failure to establish a court would be an insult to the memory of 
the dead and an affront to their survivors. Nothing less than war crimes 
prosecution would satisfy the Australian Government and the Australian 
people. There must be no impunity. The Russian veto, as she put it, 
“only compounds the atrocity”. The Prime Minister, too, called the 
Russian veto “outrageous”. Samantha Power, the U.S. Permanent 
Representative to the UN and the author of a well-known book on war 
crimes and genocide, described the attack as “heinous”, and the use of 
the veto as “tragic”.  
 
It is doubtful that too many people listening to the ABC broadcast of 
Ms Bishop’s speech would have found much to disagree with. After all, 
who could disagree with a call for justice?  
 
In Sloan Wilson’s novel The Man in the Grey Flannel Coat, a Judge 
Bernstein receives a phone call from, Schultz, a man demanding justice. 
Bernstein reflects on the call:  
 
“How violent Schultz had sounded over the phone. Í want justice’ he 
had said. I wonder how many murders have been committed and 
how many wars have been fought with that as its slogan. Justice is a 
thing that is better to give than to receive but I am sick of giving 
it…”.   
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Meanwhile, another magistrate, in John Coetzee’s Waiting for the 
Barbarians, has spent his life administering the law in a small Fort at the 
end of an unnamed empire. When Colonel Joll, from the state security 
services, arrives to dispense justice (in the form of lethal torture) to two 
barbarian fishermen accused of terrorism, the magistrate, too, becomes 
sick of justice: “Justice?  Once the word is uttered. Where will it all 
end?”(118: Vintage). Later Joll discovers that the Magistrate has a 
collection of barbarian scrolls. He takes this to be evidence of treason 
and the magistrate himself is, then, tortured. At one point, the magistrate 
is asked to read one of the scrolls:   
“See, there is only one character. It is the barbarian character war 
but it has other senses too. It can stand for vengeance. And if you 
turn it upside down like this it can be made to stand for justice. 
There is no knowing which sense is intended (122).”  
 
 
 
And John Brigge, the coroner in Ronan Bennett’s Havoc, in its Third Year, 
too, grows weary of the endless calls for justice and correction, and, like 
Coetzee’s magistrate, ends up choosing the refuge of the road over the 
administration of law. The latter two novels are haunting studies about 
lives doing justice and the refusal, in the end, to continue doing justice. 
There comes a point, it seems, when one can no longer do public justice. 
The world won’t allow it. Or justice has become revenge or the society 
has succumbed to what Judith Butler has called “penitentiary logic”.  
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These three works of literature describe a world weary of the endless 
search for perpetual justice. International law begins in this mode in 
1648 when the great European religious wars of the 16th and 17th century 
come to an end at Munster and Osnabruck. This is from the Peace of 
Westphalia 
 
“That there shall be on the one side and the other a  
perpetual…Amnesty, or Pardon of all that has been committed 
since the beginning of these Troubles,….but that all that has pass'd 
on the one side, and the other…during the War, shall be bury'd in 
eternal Oblivion”.  
 
It is these amnesties and pardons -  essential to the great diplomatic 
achievement at Westpahalia -  that are now so often deplored by 
Amnesty International and others when such mechanisms are used to 
shield human rights violators.  
 
 
 
Tonight, I want to offer a critical stocktaking of a century of doing or 
attempting to do international criminal justice. And the central question 
I think can be posed in the following terms. Can international justice be 
done in this world? And I mean this in non-metaphysical terms. In other 
words, I am not interested in whether it can be done elsewhere though 
this was one of the standard lines of thought advanced by the Nazi War 
Criminals. Adolf Eichmann, for example, whose name might come up a 
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bit tonight, demanded that he be judged before God and not before the 
District Court of Jerusalem. But let’s bracket theological inquiry and ask 
whether the world is constituted in a way that permits us to do justice in 
a manner that does not simply reproduce or re-enact injustice in a 
different and disguised register? To put this simply: is the international 
diplomatic system ready for international criminal justice?  
Or have we got ahead of ourselves a bit. To put it even more simply was 
the Nuremberg Trial, for example, “the trial of the century”, the 
moment when the allies, in Robert Jackson’s phrase, “stayed the hand of 
vengeance”; or was it - in the words of another judge, Jackson’s U.S. 
Supreme Court colleague, Justice Harlan Fiske Stone - “a high-grade 
lynching party?”.3   
 
In the case of Bennett’s and Coetzee’s magistrates and coroners, the 
societies in which justice is being pronounced just seem too fragile, 
violent, radically unequal and full of crazy superstitions to accommodate 
a form of law that does not inevitably lapse into correction, 
discretionary, spasmodic and then sadistic punishment; and the eventual 
peevish resistance of some of its practitioners. This was the insight that 
the diplomats brought to Saxony in 1648. In a world where claims to 
justice or religious truth are pursued through savage and implacable 
violence, it is best that international diplomacy sets aside the claims of 
justice altogether and simply gets on with the not-simple task of making 
                                                          
3 “History’s Greatest Trial Opens”, The Adelaide Advertiser, 20 November, 1945. “Nazi Gangsters face Judges”, 
The Melbourne Argus, 20 November, 1945. The Age also reported that Australia was the only British dominion to 
appoint a special representative at the trial. Major J.L. Lenehan would be accorded “all the privileges of the highest 
ranking personages at the trial and will stay at Nuremberg;s Grand Hotel, which is reserved for distinguished 
visitors”. 21 November, 1945, p1. The newspapers by July 1946 were carrying stories about The Holocaust and 
about British plans to punish Jewish terrorists from Irgun who had bombed the King David Hotel (at 611).  
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sure sovereigns at least get on with each other. Sovereignty, in this way, 
replaces justice.        
 
Antonio Cassese defended international criminal law by saying that some 
of it was better than nothing at all. And this is an absolutely standard 
defence of the imperfections of international criminal justice. Is it 
possible that instead some of it is worse than none of it? Indeed, that a 
lot of it might be worse than none of it? And that in order to think 
about this, one must be attentive to the intimacies between law’s 
violence and the violence that law is intended to repress (a familiar 
enough idea) and alert, too, to the violence that law, certainly 
international criminal law, might be implicated in the perpetuation of.  
At the very least, and when faced with the over-heated language of the 
political class, these seem like possibilities worth considering. But it is 
rather important that I say something else. The trial of Hisseine Habre, 
which began last week, or the Adolf Eichmann trial, represent moments 
of tremendous catharsis and, perhaps, healing for the victims of mass 
atrocity. So, any critique of international criminal justice has to reckon 
with the enormous and entirely understandable emotional appeal of such 
trials.     
 
Let me tease all this out a bit by returning to Julie Bishop. There are 
some things to notice about the MH17 diplomatic tussle. And these 
markers will appear and reappear as we move through the century.  
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First, something has happened to the way we think about the world, and 
this shift in sensibility can be felt in the differing responses to the 1988 
incident and the present crisis. It now seems natural to call for war 
crimes trials in 2015 in a way that would have seemed incongruous or 
diplomatically maladroit even as recently as 1988. And this reflects an 
adjustment in our thinking that dates back to the beginning of the 20th 
century. In essence, we seem to be in a more retributive age now than 
we were at the end of the nineteenth century, or at least, the mood of 
retribution is much more juridical than it was at that point. What might 
have seemed unnatural in 1915 has become commonplace in 2015. Of 
course we punish our enemies in trials. Haven’t we always?  
And, indeed, the language of war crimes law has become a primary 
gidiom through which war is resisted, too.  
 
In 2015, to argue against the misery of war is to speak like a lawyer. In 
1915, resisters spoke like poets. Now, though, “Serious violations of the 
laws of war” (Article 3, ICTY Statute) have displaced, in our language, 
“the butchered, frantic gestures of the dead” (Sassoon, The Counter-
Attack).    
  
This leads on to a second aspect of the MH17 and Iranian Airbus 
disputes. Notice the way in which, in both cases, the injured state cast 
the offence in the language of crime or act of war or atrocity while the 
respondent state (as it were) preferred to characterise the event as 
“human error” or political misjudgement. This I think, too, sums up the 
way in which the move from the 19th century to the 20th can be thought 
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of in terms of a revolution in the meaning of what it means to be 
defeated in war. What was once political folly became, at a certain point, 
criminal act. And so, the descriptions and redescriptions of the M17 and 
Iranian Airbus incidents mirror a whole historical transformation in the 
meaning of war. But this relationship between “incidental effect of 
political action” and “crime against humanity” lies at the very heart of 
the international criminal law problem. Do we have the moral and 
political resources to make this distinction stick? The problem is 
everywhere. International criminal law is a curious mix of moral 
certainty or righteousness, and political opportunism.  
And we seem to understand war and peace through the relationship of 
errors and crimes. Among the North Atlantic elites, decisions to go to 
war remain at worst “mistakes” to be subjected to administrative action 
(Chilcot, Hutton and Butler) or electoral reversal (Blair, Aznar). 
Elsewhere, though, such mistakes quickly become crimes (Gaddahfi’s 
war on Benghazi).  
 
In this sense, while it may be temporally accurate to say that mistakes 
have been converted into crimes at Versailles, it remains spatially the 
case that there is a sphere of administrative error and sphere of criminal 
misconduct.  
 
To put this rhetorically, their mistakes have become crimes while our 
mistakes remain mistakes.   
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Third, it is worth attending to the silences and evasions present when 
there is a call for a war crimes trial. What is not being demanded? In the 
case of the MH17, we might note that there is no call for a permanent 
tribunal to consider civil aviation terrorism in general or we might notice 
the lack of enthusiasm  for a Tribunal to look into alleged Sri Lankan 
killings of Tamils or the destruction of cultural property in Tibet. So, the 
call for an MH17 tribunal feels a little like the Royal Commission into 
Pink Batts or Windfarms. One encounters such proposals and thinks: 
why this? Why not that? And I think, again, any institutional history of 
war crimes trials has to continually reckon with this question. This is 
what I would call the problem of ad hocery.  
Ad hocery or selectivity is not just an occasional effect in the application 
of justice. Of course, one can never do justice all the time to all people 
but war crimes law is built on a deep structure of unequal application 
that can’t just be wished away by better law or the hope of moral 
improvement. International criminal justice is the application of ad hoc 
law. It always has been and it will be for the next fifty years. We must 
stop judging it by what it might become.  
And it is not just unequal application. Its norms themselves, even if they 
were applied all the time against all war criminals, would simply establish 
a world in which there was a sharp and now familiar division between 
expendable and non-expendable life or between precarious and precious 
life or between the violence of death by machete and the violence of 
death by political economy. Not man’s inhumanity to man but “the 
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inhumanity of specific categories of men”.4 (See, ICC in operative 
paragraph 6 of Resolution 1593 of 2005 referring the situation of Darfur 
to the ICC).5 
 
 
As the Malaysian representative said in the debates around the Security 
Council Resolution: “All those who travel by air will be more at risk if 
the perpetrators are not held to account”.  Maybe the world really is 
divided between people who travel by air and people who travel by boat. 
 
Finally, we have the problem of vengeance. I subtitled or titled this 
lecture, Human Rights with a Vengeance. I take this to mean at least a 
couple of things. One is that international criminal tribunals are 
imagined, I think, as a way of giving human rights machinery the 
potency that itl,;,lmkkk has sometimes lacked. To apply human rights 
with a vengeance is to apply rights with power, credible force and 
vigour.  
I don’t think I have come across a single student in the past ten years 
who has expressed an interest in working for the UN Human Rights 
Committee. The UN Human Rights Committee, as many of us know, 
promotes and encourages human rights observance. If Weber is right, 
and politics is the long, slow boring of holes. Then the Human Rights 
                                                          
4  G. Simpson, Law, War & Crime – War Crimes Trials and the Reinvention of International Law (Polity Press, 2007), at 
51. See also, C. Gevers, ‘International criminal law and individualism: An African perspective’, in C. Schwöbel, 
Critical Approaches to International Criminal Law: An Introduction (Routledge, 2014) 221.  
5  S.C.Res. 1593, U.N.Doc.S/RES/1593 (March 31, 2005), at op. para. 6. For a useful discussion of the various 
ways that operative paragraph 6 may be interpreted, see R. Cryer, ‘Sudan, Resolution 1593, and International 
Criminal Justice’, 19 Leiden Journal of International Law (2006) 195, at 209-214. For other attempts by the Security 
Council to limit the jurisdictional reach of the ICC, see S.C. Res. 1422, U.N.Doc.S/RES/1422 (July 12, 2002), 
at op. para. 1; S.C. Res. 1487, U.N.Doc.S/RES/1487 (June 12, 2003) (renewing Resolution 1422); and S.C. Res. 
1497, U.N.Doc.S/RES/1497 (August 1, 2003), at op. para. 7. 
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Committee is boring very deep holes, very slowly. This might feel like 
bureaucratic madness or institutional heroism. Whatever it is, this sort of 
human rights work – patient, cajoling, politically sensitive  – is nowhere 
near as glamorous or high-profile as working for international criminal 
courts. I once received a letter from a person working on the 
prosecution team at a war crimes trial. He wanted me to read a quite 
lengthy draft essay of his on some aspect of international criminal law 
doctrine. Because I didn’t know him and because I wasn’t interested in 
reading the essay - and because I haven’t yet read The Brothers Karamzov - 
I very politely declined and wished him well in his work.  
I received an outraged email back the next day accusing me of being 
uncollegial and reminding me that he was “prosecuting President…”. 
Well, I won’t say which President he was prosecuting. The point is that, 
for some people, to work in international criminal tribunals is to feel 
oneself to be at the very centre of international politics and to be, unlike 
everyone else in that realm, riding on the wings of angels: doing human 
rights not with a slow boring of holes but with vengeance.  
 
But vengeance has more literal meanings though, too. Is international 
criminal law a form of human rights work motivated or inspired by a 
desire for vengeance? Revenge is never announced as the engine or 
rationale for war crimes trials. The standard panoply of justifications 
include remembrance, reconciliation, vindication and, usually wedded 
together, peace and justice.  But as we can see some of the language of 
the M17 diplomatic spat sounds quite full-blooded and full, too, of 
intimations of revenge. 
15 
 
 
And, - and here I begin my long awaited stock-taking - international 
criminal law begins with a moment of vengeful fury. 
 
 
1915: Edith Cavell at the tir national , Brussels;  Billy Hughes in 
Whitehall: “Treason against Mankind”. 
 
When does history begin? Or the history of a particular field? One 
possible history of war crimes law begins, conveniently almost exactly 
100 years ago. We are in the era of the anniversary: The Somme, 
Gallipoli, Vimy Ridge. My history begins on August 3rd, 1915 with the 
court martial of an English nurse, Edith Cavell. Cavell had been found 
guilty of aiding Allied prisoners in their escape from Belgium during the 
German occupation of Belgium. She was convicted of a breach of 
German military regulations and an act of treason.  
A strange charge in this context - given that Cavell owed no loyalty to 
the German state - but a charge that has, as we shall see, an interesting 
history in this field of law. Despite a flurry of diplomatic protests – the 
German ambassador to the US, rather unhelpfully, said he would shoot 
five English nurses if he had them in custody - Cavell was executed on 
the morning of October 14th at the National Rifle Range in Brussels.  
The Germans, already accused, often falsely, of unspeakable crimes 
against the Belgian population, were immediately demonised further. 
Lloyd George went to the 1918 election with one of the most 
compelling election slogans of the 20th century: “Hang the Kaiser”. The 
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promise was made, and though the Kaiser remained resolutely unhanged 
after the war, this promise became the foundation of international 
criminal law. Kaiser Wilhelm died peacefully on June 3, 1941 a month or 
so before Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union and these two events 
together conjoin two origins of the field at Versailles and later at 
Nuremberg where Hitler’s march on Moscow is prosecuted as a crime of 
aggression.   
 
 
Back in 1918, though at the Imperial War Cabinet meeting, at 12 noon 
on November 20th Lloyd George is presenting his proposal to try the 
Kaiser for the crime of aggression. Lord Curzon, the Lord President of 
the Council, opens the meeting by remarking that there is no need even 
to argue for the trial of the Kaiser. He is after all, “the arch-criminal”.  
Indeed, as Curzon reports, the French had not yet bothered to consult 
their own jurists about international law. No matter, the Kaiser could be 
put on trial and declared a “universal outlaw”. Indeed, he goes on, 
wouldn’t it be ideal to begin the League of Nations experiment on this 
note of trial and retribution?.  Lloyd George continued the discussion. 
“With regard to international law, well [such a lot hanging on that word 
“well”], we are making international law and all we can claim is that 
international law should be based on justice….there is a sense of justice 
in the world”.   
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There is some resistance to this innovation, though. Billy Hughes, the 
Australian Prime Minster, is puzzled by the suggestion. As he famously 
puts it: “why not try Alexander the Great and Moses”?  
 
Hughes’s point seems to be that what we call the “crime of aggression” 
used to be known as “history”. “You cannot indict a man for making 
war”, Hughes continues. And, in a supremely evocative phrase, he 
equates the whole idea of criminalising war with what he called: “treason 
against mankind”.  
 
An absurd and eccentric idea for him, but a phrase that carries 
enormous weight now as we consider how un-self-conscious we have 
become about deploying the international community against outlaws, or 
about referring to “crimes against humanity”.  Hughes is. in the end. 
outvoted but not before he receives some support from the Minister for 
Munitions, only there in an advisory capacity. This minister, Winston 
Churchill, argues that the Allies would be “within our rights to kill the 
Kaiser as an act of vengeance” but that it would be much more dubious 
to deal with him on the basis of “what is called justice and law” (note 
the hesitant phrasing). Churchill remains attached to this idea in 1945 
when he at first seems to support summary execution for the defeated 
Nazi elites.     
 
At Versailles, then, the law of war crimes begins with some familiar 
patterns: anxiety about the relationship between revenge and justice, a 
cavalier attitude to the role of actual lawyers, a belief on the part of 
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proponents of trial that the justice of the cause renders unnecessary legal 
process and precedent, and the first sign that when it comes to war 
crimes and crimes against humanity, the identity of the perpetrators 
matters as much as the identity of the crime.            
 
 
 
 
1937:  Nikolai Bukharin in Moscow, Winston Smith at Victory 
Gardens: Mistakes, Crimes, Spectacle 
Treason, of course depends less on what is done and more on where 
one stands.  And where one stands can be a matter of chance.  Or as 
Lenin once put it: “he went into one room and found himself in 
another”. Usually, the history of war crimes trials passes over the inter-
war years in silence. This was a period in which the efforts of 
progressives seem to be directed at social and economic change or 
minority rights treaties or welfare or the sort of softer internationalism 
found in Geneva at the League of Nations. But are the Moscow Show 
Trials, perhaps, the missing link between Versailles and Nuremberg? 
Historians of international criminal law tend to think of Solferino or The 
Hague Peace Conference in 1899 or the German war crimes trials in 
Leipzig as the precursors to the trials in post-war Germany.  Moscow, 
1937 is an embarrassing antecedent after all. Judith Shklar defines show 
trials as the “liquidation of political enemies using legal procedure”. 
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Stalin knew all about that but, in this, he does not seem too far removed 
from Lloyd George and Lord Curzon. Establishing a tribunal for the 
specific purpose of liquidating or punishing an enemy? This is what the 
Imperial War Cabinet was debating in 1918 and it looks a little like what 
the Security Council was debating two weeks ago.   
 
 
 
Of course, the Moscow Show Trials were very unlike the Nuremberg 
War Crimes Trials in many very important respects but the idea that 
people’s justice or humanity’s justice or a sense of justice can somehow 
dispose of the need for proper procedure or legal precedent represents a 
sort of sibling dark side of these trials. A show trial is one in which it is 
obvious that the guilty are guilty. The trial seems otiose, the mere 
performance of a justice already delivered elsewhere. Vishinsky, the 
Soviet Prosecutor at Moscow was also at Nuremberg.  During dinner 
with the judges at Nuremberg he raises a toast “To the defendants, they 
will all hang”. This was before the trial had begun. But Roosevelt, too, 
was worried about acquittals and his concerns made their way into the 
IMT Charter where Article 19 states that  
 
“The Tribunal shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence. It shall 
adopt and apply to the greatest possible extent expeditious and 
nontechnical procedure, and shall admit any evidence which it deems to 
be of probative value.”      
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But then maybe these trials are as much about political spectacle as they 
are about legal propriety. For Hannah Arendt, a show trial is a “spectacle 
with prearranged results” or the obliteration through compulsive staging 
of “the irreducible risk” of acquittal. The point of the trial is the trial 
itself: its ramifications, its warnings, it effluxions of terror. George 
Orwell understood this.   
 
Mrs Parsons lives with her two little daemonic children at Victory 
Mansions. Her drains are blocked, as they often are, and she calls 
Winston Smith down to help her unblock the sink. The two children 
torment Winston, calling him a Eurasian spy, threatening to vaporise 
him and shouting “Goldstein” as he leaves the flat. Mrs Parsons is 
apologetic; the children are furious, she explains, because she failed to 
take them to the hanging:  
“Some Eurasian prisoners, guilty of war crimes, were 
to be hanged that evening…this happened once a 
month and was a popular spectacle” (at 22 (1949: 
1974 Penguin Books). 
It strikes me as important to think about trials in this way; not as 
depoliticised programmes of management but as slightly wild-eyed 
theatres of revenge: human rights with a vengeance. As one of the 
observers of the Moscow Show Trials eerily put it: these were “dramas 
of subjective innocence and objective guilt”. This objective guilt was 
repeatedly enunciated in the months preceding the major trials at 
Nuremberg and Tokyo where the Nazis are repeatedly described as the 
world’s worst criminals and where the defendants were chosen with 
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great care on the basis of political impact. The show trials, themselves, 
continued into the 1950s, most famously in Prague where the purpose 
was not to determine guilt or innocence, nor, even, to remove political 
opponents but rather to create them.  
The trials there were initially conceived as trials of fairly low-level 
apparatchiks.   
 Under pressure from Moscow, President Gottwald found a higher level 
defendant, Otto Sling, a district party secretary. Under torture, Sling 
implicated Rudolf Slansky, the General Secretary of the Czech 
Communist Party, in a fantastic and implausible conspiracy. Finally the 
Soviet advisers had a defendant of sufficient seniority. The Czechs were 
initially shocked and bemused. What about the evidence? One Soviet 
legal adviser, soon to be himself purged, said: “We have been sent here 
to stage trials not to check whether the charges are true”.  
 
As for the existence of legal norms. Again this didn’t matter. The 
instincts of the proletariat would stand in for what Kyrlenko, one of the 
Moscow prosecutors, called “Bourgeois sophistry”. And this recalls, too, 
a Nazi Law of June 28, 1935 referring to the need to punish criminals 
and deviants   according to “the sound perceptions of the people”. Ten 
years later, though, President Roosevelt was worrying about acquittals 
on technicalities and Robert Jackson - pressed on the existence of crimes 
against humanity or aggression - replied by saying “We can avoid these 
pitfalls of definition if our test of what is a crime gives recognition to 
those things which fundamentally outrage the conscience of the 
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American people”. This became at trial the idea of “shocking the 
conscience of mankind”.  
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1945: Francoise de Menthon at the Peace Palace, Primo Levi at 
Auschwitz: Crimes against Humanity 
 
Mankind, of course, has now become humanity. Just as the old 
language of enemies of mankind has been reworked as “crimes against 
humanity”. When someone at the Imperial War Cabinet asks what crime 
the Kaiser is being charged with, Lloyd George replies: ‘The crime of 
plunging this country into war”. Sir Robert Borden, the Canadian PM, 
smoothly offered a gloss on this by interjecting that “it was a crime 
against humanity”.  And there it is, the moment when the Great Powers 
begin to think of themselves as “humanity’ rather than a coalition of 
victorious powers. At least the victors at Vienna 100 years earlier merely 
thought of themselves as “Europe”.  But the idea of “crimes against 
Europe”, while far more accurate as a description of extra-textual law, 
might seem too openly self-serving.  
What then are crimes against humanity? Justice Kirby noted in the 
High Court’s 2008 decision, The Queen v Tang, that those “who engage in 
“slavery”, piracy and other special crimes are enemies of mankind” 
(para. 111). 
François de Menthon, one of the French Prosecutors at the 
Nuremberg war crimes trial in 1945, was assigned the task of defining 
humanity. The context was a trial in which a more or less new legal 
category – crimes against humanity – had to be created to encompass 
the system of abuse and murder instituted by the Nazis in the mid-
1930’s.  
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De Menthon invokes three distinguishable concepts. The first two 
were familiar enough but the third, and most radical, concept of 
humanity saw it as a unified and indivisible category, a moral or juridical 
agent. There is a paradox at the heart of international criminal justice 
though. While its core animating idea is the abolition of all distinctions 
within humanity, some of its most energetic practices are dedicated to 
punishing “inhumane” acts (acts committed by individuals who have lost 
their humanity?) and acting on behalf of humanity against those who are 
deemed to have stepped outside or defied humanity (think of Leon 
Bourgeois, at the Versailles Peace Conference, insisting on “penalties to 
be imposed for disobedience to the common will of civilized nations” 
(Paris Peace Conference 1919: 185)) or the editorial in The Canberra 
Times on 3 October, 1946, p3 which thundered that the Nuremberg trial 
was “….a landmark from which the United Nations must press on to 
police and enforce world peace against all potential or actual 
disturbances of the peace or crimes against humanity”.6  
 
Its favoured penalties, indeed, often come in the form of extreme 
violence applied to these outsiders (historically, the quartering of pirates, 
the beheading of tyrants; more recently, the hanging of war criminals 
and the waging of “humanitarian wars”). But this history of violence 
does not appear to have unseated or even qualified humanity’s self-
confidence. Speaking very much in this vein, Raymond Poincarē, the 
                                                          
6 Quoted In Paul Bartrop, “Nuremberg Trials as Viwed from Australia” Australian Jewish Historical Society Journal, 
November, 1994, Volume 12, p606-618.    
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French President, announced, also at Versailles: “Humanity can place 
confidence in you, because you are not among those who have outraged 
the rights of humanity” (Paris Peace Conference 1919:159).  
 
But humanity here included the Belgians, French and British each of 
whom were, by this time, responsible for three centuries of sometimes 
violent, certainly racially-inflected, Empire.  
 
Though the Imperial War Cabinet meeting on November 20th began 
at noon, there was a lot to get through. The main line of business was 
the disposition of the Kaiser. What were the representatives of humanity 
going to do about this outlaw? But first, there were some minor matters 
to take care of. Lloyd George: “there are two or three questions we are 
not clear about…Palestine, East Africa…questions of that kind” (at 2). 
“We have not quite settled in our minds what sort of government we will set up 
in Mesopotamia”. It was ever thus. Here are the representatives of 
civilization, just prior to elaborating the idea that aggressive war would 
be a crime against humanity, reordering their imperial outposts, 
themselves, as Justice Pal remarked at Tokyo, the result of three 
centuries of aggressive war.  
I went back recently to the National Archive documentation from 
this meeting. How did the Imperial War Cabinet get from its own 
imperial consolidations and restructurings to the enemy’s crimes against 
humanity? After all they each seemed to be grounded on precisely the 
same combination of non-consensual territorial acquisition and mass 
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violations of human rights. Was there a hint of self-consciousness? What 
was the hinge?  
Well, between the surprisingly cursory discussion of Palestine, Syria 
and Iraq and the lengthier debate about the Kaiser there is one short 
announcement. A telegram is read out from the Association of Universal 
Loyal Negroes of Panama. It reads: “Negroes throughout Panama send 
congratulations on your victory and in return for services rendered by 
the negroes throughout the world in fighting…beg that their heritage 
wrested from Germany in Africa may become the negro national home 
with self-government”.   
This is passed over in silence and the discussion moves on to the 
Kaiser’s terrible crime of making war on Europe and the shock this 
delivered to the conscience of mankind.     
 
 
 
1961: “Lolita” in Jerusalem: A Very Short Digression  
 
Mankind is, of course, shocked by many different things at different 
times, something the US advisors, Robert Lansing and James Brown 
Scott argued at Versailles when they resisted whole idea of crimes 
against humanity claiming that there was no such thing as humanity, 
only nations with different moral outlooks. In Jerusalem, Adolf 
Eichmann seemed unshockable. His thoughtlessness, indeed, was his 
most remarkable quality. Arendt, again: “The longer one listened to him 
the more obvious it became that his inability to speak was closely 
27 
 
connected to his inability to think…he was genuinely incapable of 
uttering a single sentence that was not a cliché”(328-329).  He seemed 
curiously affectless, in other words.  At one point, he is handed some 
novels to read. One of them is Lolita. After two days Eichmann returned 
the novel, visibly indignant; “That is quite an unwholesome book”, he 
tells the guard.      
 
 
1987-1998: Klaus Barbie in Lyon, Dusko Tadic in The Hague, 
Martin Bormann in Frankfurt: “Nazis and others” 
 
While Eichmann was running the Final Solution from an office in Berlin 
and then Budapest, Klaus Barbie was hunting down Jean Moulin, the 
French Resistance leader in Lyon in 1942. Barbie might have found 
Moulin in Francoise de Menthon’s house where he occasionally spent 
time. de Menthon at this time had become a resistance sympathiser. 
Barbie tortured Moulin to death but de Menthon went on to develop the 
concept of crimes against humanity at Nuremberg, a category of 
criminality that would be later applied to Barbie himself during his trial 
in Lyon in 1985. The Barbie case ought to be given its full name: The 
Federation of Resistance Fighters v Klaus Barbie. This was to be the trial that 
established a judicial record of the heroism of the French resistance. 
There was a small problem though. At ten past eight in the morning of 
April 6th, 1944, Klaus Barbie had sent a telex to the Office for Jewish 
Affairs in Paris. It reads:  
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“This morning, the Jewish children’s home “colonie enfant” in 
Izieu was cleaned…total 41 children aged 3 through 13 years were 
apprehended….Transport to Drancy to follow”.          
 
The children were transported in manacles to Paris and then sent east to 
the camps. All of them were murdered (two of the boys were executed 
in Tallinn, Estonia).  
 
But the trial was a curious affair. What was it about? From the 
perspective of the French State, it was about French resistance to Nazi 
occupation. Jewish groups in Lyon needless to say believed that the trial 
would provide some reckoning for Barbie’s micro-Holocaust at Izieu. 
Barbie’s defence lawyer, Jacques Verges - later to defend Carlos the 
Jackal and Saddam Hussein – believed the trial was an opportunity to 
embarrass the French state by pointing to crimes against humanity closer 
to home: institutionalised torture in Algeria and fascist collaboration in 
war-time Vichy. And so, a problem emerged. From the perspective of 
the prosecuting state, crimes against humanity in its then standard 
definition was a category both over and under inclusive. Over-inclusive 
in the sense that it threatened to encompass French colonialism in 
Algeria, under-inclusive in that it seemed to be about attacks on civilians 
and therefore could not encompass Barbie’s murderous behaviour 
towards the French resistance.  But as someone once said, every war 
crimes trial is saying this of the prosecuting state: “We, at least, and 
whatever we have done in the past or might do in the future, are not 
Nazis”. And so, crimes against humanity in the Barbie trial were defined 
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as crimes committed in furtherance of a policy of racial discrimination. 
Broad enough now to cover the resistance crimes, narrow enough to 
exclude Algeria where the French, at least, were not Nazis.    
 
The narrowing, at least, was quite explicit. Recalling the original French 
draft at Nuremberg,  crimes against humanity were defined as crimes 
committed by a state practising an ideology of racial discrimination.  
Though the Court in Barbie seemed to narrow the reach of crimes 
against humanity improperly this simply reflected a long-standing 
tendency to equate crimes against humanity with a very particular genre 
of crimes against humanity, namely the crimes of Nazis. Indeed, from 
1945 to 1997 (Tokyo apart), it would have been possible to figure the 
history of war crimes as a history of Nazi war crimes. In the Australian 
War Crimes amendment act, for example, war crimes are defined as 
those crimes committed in Europe between 1939 and 1945. So, in a way, 
international criminal law often begins in the spirit of universalism but 
ends in the practice of particularism. Crimes against humanity are acts 
committed anywhere by anyone against anyone at anytime but not here, 
not now, not before 1988, not in relation to this person who is protected 
by her official position, not in relation to these peacekeepers immunised 
through Security Council Resolution 1224, only if the perpetrators acted 
in the name of national socialist ideology and so on. 
 
Of course an orthodox account of the history of international criminal 
law inverts this trajectory thinking of the practice of tribunals as having 
begun with the particular (victors justice at Nuremberg) and ended in 
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the universal (the ICC with its broad ranging jurisdiction). So, we might 
say that modern de-nazified retributive legalism begins on May 8th, 1997, 
the day that Dusko Tadic is convicted of murder as a crime against 
humanity: the first non-Nazi to be tried before an international criminal 
court in Europe since 1946, and one of the first non-Nazis to be tried 
anywhere for crimes against humanity.  Or maybe it begins a year later 
when a set of human remains are subject to DNA testing in Frankfurt 
and determined to be those of Martin Bormann, the last Nazi, or at least 
the last of the Nuremberg defendants to be unaccounted for. Bormann’s 
ashes are scattered in the Baltic just as Eichmann’s are disposed of in the 
Mediterranean. These removals at sea anticipating the burial of Osama 
Bin Laden and perhaps gesturing back to the roots of war crimes law 
and anti-terrorism jurisdiction in the original crime of crimes, namely 
that of piracy on the high seas.  
 
Let me begin to come to an end….  
 
Has modern international criminal law somehow cleansed itself of the 
moral obtuseness and political opportunism of those early trials that 
have formed most of this evening’s history? The legal principles certainly 
seem more transparent yet the institutions are engineered in a way that 
makes even facially apolitical prosecution and trial unlikely. “We are 
objects of history” as Varenc Vagi said on his way to the gallows in 
Prague after his show trial. The practice of international war crimes law 
suggests that only those on the wrong side of history get prosecuted: 
Ghaddafi, the Lord’s Resistance Army, Radovan Karadzic, Omar Bashir.       
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To situate the development of international criminal law in its historical 
setting, then is to suggest that crimes against humanity do not simply 
exist in some supervening ethical space to be picked off by appropriately 
articulated rules.  Crimes against humanity are violent acts committed by 
enemies of mankind in concrete circumstances. And the enemies of 
mankind change depending on the exigencies of the situation. Every 
legal rule expressed in neutral, generally applicable language seems to 
have another more particular norm hovering, ghost-like, around it. At 
first the transparency of these ideological commitments is almost 
touching.  At Versailles, the Kaiser is specifically indicted in Article 227 
of the Peace Treaty.  By Nuremberg, there is a softening of this 
language; a not-very-good faith effort to make it sound like a universally-
applicable legal rule. Remember the French wanted this definition of 
aggression at Nuremberg: “Aggression is an act carried out by the 
European Axis Powers in breach of treaties and in violation of 
international law” (Hankey, 21). In Barbie and Eichmann, these tendencies 
continue. There is less of this around now but the most recent 
articulation of a legal rule came in 2010 with the definition of aggression 
added to the Rome Statute by the Kampala Agreements. The crime of 
aggression is now defined as “a manifest violation of the UN Charter”. 
“Manifestness” will depend on scale, gravity and character. Character 
will depend on the existence of an arguable legal case. The existence of 
an arguable legal case will at least partly depend on the particular 
position of the state making that case.  
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In particular, international criminal law, properly anatomised, 
continues to be in most instances the law applied to “enemies of 
mankind”.  
   
 
2015: Four Gardens: Lloyd-George at Versailles, West at 
Nuremberg, Woolf at Address in Bloomsbury, Woman in a 
Refugee Camp.  
 
But what should we make of this history? This is a matter that requires 
enormous delicacy. Thousands of people work conscientiously in the 
field of war crimes law (investigating, prosecuting, helping victims, trying 
to reform the system, calling for universal forms of justice, arguing 
against Great Power immunity), many more victims of horrible atrocities 
view a trial as their last great hope for justice.  No-one can read about 
the moral strenuousness of the witnesses in the Eichmann Trial or the 
personal anguish of a man like Hersch Lauterpacht (struggling in 
Cambridge to develop a workable theory of crimes against humanity 
while his family disappears into the Polish and Ukrainian bloodlands) or 
the bravery of those testifying in the Balkan trials in The Hague without 
stopping to acknowledge that the law of war crimes has become a site of 
great courage and the bearer of the some of the ethical hopes of 
humanity.  
Yet, there is something deeply awry with this system of justice. Indeed, 
one could justifiably describe it as a system of injustice. And these are 
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not just remediable defects of the sort one might encounter in the way 
Family Law is administered in France. Rather they go to the question of 
what it might mean to live under the rule of law in a particular society. 
The history I have recounted leads to a possible conclusion that crimes 
against humanity are those crimes committed by enemies of mankind. 
Let me put the two problems in this way: the identity of the violator 
seems more significant -  decisive even - than the identity or nature of 
the violation. But, more than this, the identity of the violations is already 
too narrowly imagined creating morally suspect distinctions between 
different types of violence.  
 
The question always asked of the critic is “well, what instead?”. In 2002, 
I participated in a debate about the legality of the Iraq War. I offered 
several arguments against the war. During the question and answer 
period, a man stood up at the back and asked me what I would do about 
Iraq? I replied that if not intervening in Iraq constituted doing nothing, 
then I would prefer to do nothing. Not creating a war crimes tribunal to 
specifically investigate MH 17 might strike many people as the right 
thing to do. But the objections one might have to the Bishop Initiative 
might easily bleed into the whole edifice of international criminal law. 
Certainly, not doing international criminal law might help us attend to 
other things. How helpful is it to demonise Russia using international 
criminal law? Haven’t we been here before at Versailles? In Baghdad?  
The world is very complicated but international criminal justice can be 
very simple-minded and linear.  
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How should we respond to atrocity? The truth is I don’t really 
know. I am not even sure that war crimes law isn’t sometimes the right 
answer: maybe in North Korea, maybe in Colombia or Georgia. But law 
often is experienced as incongruous or technocratic or literal. Could it be 
that the more we memorialise through elaborate legal ritual, the less we 
are capable of remembering as moral event? 
 
What Primo Levi, the Italian chemist and Auschwitz survivor, feared 
most of all on his release from the death camps was disbelief. In one of 
his earliest books he describes a meeting with a lawyer shortly after the 
liberation of Auschwitz. The interview is marked by awkwardness on the 
part of Levi and, on the lawyer’s side, incredulity. At the conclusion of 
the meeting, the lawyer gets up, shakes the writer’s hand and “urbanely 
excuses himself.” There was nothing the lawyer could do in the face of 
this survivor testimony. He could neither believe it nor find a legal 
response to it. Perhaps, if I had to sum up the argument right now, I 
would argue that we might consider sometimes electing the agonising 
uncertainties of Primo Levi over the solemn and definitive judgments of 
international criminal justice.  
Or we might do some gardening.  
Unusually for a law journal, each front cover of the London Review of 
International  Law features a different photograph. The 2015, volume 3 
Issue 1 cover has a photograph by Simon Norfolk from his series: A 
Place of Refuge: The First Safe Place. The place is a refugee camp on the 
border of Chechenya and Ingushetia. Many of the people living there 
have been in the camp since 1999. It’s a bleak place but at the centre of 
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the photograph is an image of Malika Hussienova and her family 
standing outside their military green tent. Surrounding the tent is a 
formal vegetable garden: a mini-Versailles and a small gesture of 
hopefulness after atrocity.   
 
The story I have told began near the gardens at Versailles where the 
Great Powers in 1919 engineered one of the most transformative 
reforms in international legal history when war, for the first time in 
history, became crime. Twenty years later, working outside another 
greenhouse (probably in Gordon or Tavistock Square in Bloomsbury), 
Leonard Woolf was interrupted in his gardening by a call from his wife 
Virginia. “Hitler is on the radio giving a speech”, she shouts. Leonard 
calls back: “I shan’t come. I am planting iris, and they will be flowering 
long after he is dead”. (Glendinning, 344) Iris reticulate is a violet-
coloured iris. In the final sentence of Leonard Woolf’s biography, 
“Downhill All the Way”, these irises are still blooming 21 years after 
Hitler’s suicide.    
Nine months after Hitler’s suicide, the Nuremberg War Crimes Trial 
began. In A Train of Powder, Rebecca West remembers being asked what 
was the most remarkable thing she had witnessed at Nuremberg. Well, 
she said, there was a man with one leg and a girl growing cyclamens in a 
greenhouse.  As I have said elsewhere, the bathos in this – a sort of 
decentering of the trial - makes us smile.  This little girl is demanding 
our engaged sentiments not our pitying tears, we want her horticulture 
to succeed. Here she is growing her cyclamens only a few months after 
Bomber Command’s final assault on the civilian population of 
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Nuremberg on the night of 16-17 March when 277 Lancasters 
pulverised the remnants of the historic centre for the second time. 
‘Nuremberg” refers to the trial, of course, but also, now, for me at least, 
the bombing and the greenhouse. West sounds as if she is a little 
disaffected by the justice on offer at Nuremberg. And this mirrors the 
mood of Hannah Arendt when she goes to Jerusalem in search of justice 
and discovers instead spectacle. Sometimes, it is permissible to be sick of 
justice: sick of receiving it, sick of giving it, sick of its imperfect 
instantiations in an imperfect world.  
International criminal justice – the great institutional machine 
engineered by talented and humane diplomats, kept in motion by 
lawyers who have sacrificed material reward for a life in pursuit of 
humanitarian ends, directed at putting defeated enemies and human 
rights violators in jail, and celebrated every week in a public lecture 
advertising its virtues – might now be one of the less auspicious ways to 
do good in the world.   
  
 
